Deliberately mis-splining as additional security

[98G]

Why not put the spline key deliberately wrong and thus move the forbidden zone? Then when setting the combination be sure to put the 3rd number of the combination in the original forbidden zone?

It should cause fits for the less experienced manipulator. The contact points aren't where you'd expect them, and the 3rd number is in the area you'd skip over.

It should at least cost some time...

[FranklyFlawless]

That assumes the attacker relies on patterns and "best practices", like how a locksmith would know factory combinations from common manufacturers. If your threat model is someone familiar with this knowledge, then your reasoning makes sense.

[98G]

That assumes the attacker relies on patterns and "best practices", like how a locksmith would know factory combinations from common manufacturers. If your threat model is someone familiar with this knowledge, then your reasoning makes sense.

I'd take this a step further and suggest that altering your safe so that it doesn't match factory spec will also add a level of security. If the lock inside isn't what the factory specifies, then the driling template will cause you to drill in the wrong place and possibly trigger a relocker.

When I first encountered an 8500 series lock i was stopped cold by the oddball dialing technique. I tried the factory default in the normal manner and got nothing of course. I had relegated that safe to the collection of locked safes to be broken into later when i get around to it. A few months later I got a single drawer safe with an 8500 series lock that was already open and unlocked and learned the "trick". I went back and successfully opened the first one with the factory default using the "trick".

GSA weapons container with 8500 series Group 1 lock -

https://ibb.co/nnXG0MS

It's also my understanding that thieves essentially never burglarize a safe by means of defeating the lock. The path of least resistance is almost always to simply defeat the container.

[Kaesekopf]

That assumes the attacker relies on patterns and "best practices", like how a locksmith would know factory combinations from common manufacturers. If your threat model is someone familiar with this knowledge, then your reasoning makes sense.

I'd take this a step further and suggest that altering your safe so that it doesn't match factory spec will also add a level of security. If the lock inside isn't what the factory specifies, then the driling template will cause you to drill in the wrong place and possibly trigger a relocker.

When I first encountered an 8500 series lock i was stopped cold by the oddball dialing technique. I tried the factory default in the normal manner and got nothing of course. I had relegated that safe to the collection of locked safes to be broken into later when i get around to it. A few months later I got a single drawer safe with an 8500 series lock that was already open and unlocked and learned the "trick". I went back and successfully opened the first one with the factory default using the "trick".

GSA weapons container with 8500 series Group 1 lock -

https://ibb.co/nnXG0MS

It's also my understanding that thieves essentially never burglarize a safe by means of defeating the lock. The path of least resistance is almost always to simply defeat the container.

Mis-splining the dial: Sargent and greenleaf had for a while options to spline at 41 or 50.
As far as if that would throw me off, basically not at all, unless of course I can’t feel contact points at all on something like a gravity fence. I always check the forbidden area, even on wheel 3, and if it is a lock with a blank space between 0 and 100, I will check that area anyway, usually to park wheels in an optimum spot. I have a Chubb bankers lock with 4 wheels where the best place to park for isolation was about what would be approximately 107.

About the 8500, are you saying you learned a trick to manipulate, or how to push the dial then turn?

Cheers!

[98G]

That assumes the attacker relies on patterns and "best practices", like how a locksmith would know factory combinations from common manufacturers. If your threat model is someone familiar with this knowledge, then your reasoning makes sense.

I'd take this a step further and suggest that altering your safe so that it doesn't match factory spec will also add a level of security. If the lock inside isn't what the factory specifies, then the driling template will cause you to drill in the wrong place and possibly trigger a relocker.

When I first encountered an 8500 series lock i was stopped cold by the oddball dialing technique. I tried the factory default in the normal manner and got nothing of course. I had relegated that safe to the collection of locked safes to be broken into later when i get around to it. A few months later I got a single drawer safe with an 8500 series lock that was already open and unlocked and learned the "trick". I went back and successfully opened the first one with the factory default using the "trick".

GSA weapons container with 8500 series Group 1 lock -

https://ibb.co/nnXG0MS

It's also my understanding that thieves essentially never burglarize a safe by means of defeating the lock. The path of least resistance is almost always to simply defeat the container.

Mis-splining the dial: Sargent and greenleaf had for a while options to spline at 41 or 50.
As far as if that would throw me off, basically not at all, unless of course I can’t feel contact points at all on something like a gravity fence. I always check the forbidden area, even on wheel 3, and if it is a lock with a blank space between 0 and 100, I will check that area anyway, usually to park wheels in an optimum spot. I have a Chubb bankers lock with 4 wheels where the best place to park for isolation was about what would be approximately 107.

About the 8500, are you saying you learned a trick to manipulate, or how to push the dial then turn?

Cheers!

The push and turn. I had never encountered it before and had no idea it existed.

Thanks for the reply. I appreciate your perspective.

[FranklyFlawless]

I'd take this a step further and suggest that altering your safe so that it doesn't match factory spec will also add a level of security. If the lock inside isn't what the factory specifies, then the driling template will cause you to drill in the wrong place and possibly trigger a relocker.

That assumes the attacker will use a drill and the swapped lock is correctly installed on the safe without compromising its security.

[98G]

I'd take this a step further and suggest that altering your safe so that it doesn't match factory spec will also add a level of security. If the lock inside isn't what the factory specifies, then the driling template will cause you to drill in the wrong place and possibly trigger a relocker.

That assumes the attacker will use a drill and the swapped lock is correctly installed on the safe without compromising its security.

It does make those assumptions. It only complicates that one particular mode of attack. And that's a mode of attack unlikely to be used outside of a locksmith shop.

Since most safe locks have the same footprint, swapping locks is pretty trivial.

Even when the footprint is different, making an adapter plate isn't difficult. I've done it to put a modern electronic lock into an older vault door and I've done it to put a modern electronic lock into an antique safe.

Pictured - A GSA security container with the SCIF lock removed and an S&G electronic lock installed.
https://ibb.co/VTxWmv6