scary new lock design

[sevedus]

Adrian, Michigan April 13, 2009
To the Moderator and Readers,

My associate Mr. Dickerson confessed to “chumming the water” by invading your chat-space in the guise of a dubious Irishman from Boston. I’m sorry if anyone is offended by this. It was a painfully transparent effort, as the readership quickly pointed out, to “get some buzz” going. The objective (which was not to irritate people but to get some discussion going) was quite successful, and so it would appear that Eric selected the right venue, if not the appropriate approach. I’d like to thank the readership for their responses, and because so many of these responses spoke to the questions directly let me answer them.
1) The animations you saw on the web site are exemplary of design evolution. The limitations of those designs were well rehearsed by the readership: vulnerable to impressioning; difficult to manufacture because of the “analogue” permutation geometry.
2) The issue of being able to “test” each motion of the pins was indeed raised at the Dutch Open, taken to heart and well considered in the design we’ll be releasing soon.
3) Because we’ve considered vulnerabilities other than picking and will disclose our responses to them in the animation of the actual product design that we’ll market, that animation is being vetted by our patent attorney. The market design implements the embodiment revealed last in the patent in which all of the permutation surfaces on the cam are identical as are all of the bit lands on the key and they are assembled rather than machined from solid stock. The line of the pins is across the keyway rather than along it, allowing any pin to be “next” in the sequence at any point. When a pin is displaced by a bit land or a picking tool it will always engage a permutation surface. The engagement always produces motion of the cam in one of the two available axis, i.e., rotary or axial and in either direction of both, so when the covert action of the cam occurs in response to the displacement of a pin there is no way to distinguish the three dysfunctional responses of the cam from the one in which it advances the sequential motion. Further, in order to “test” any given pin as “next” in the sequence it is necessary to release the one “correct” pin which holds the cam in the current sequence position. Because the travel distance of all pin displacements is the same, whether they produce sequential or random motion in the cam, impressioning will be a non-event. Lastly, the springs which bias the pins are much stronger than those which bias the cam, making the proposition of “feeling” the cam’s motion unlikely.
4) You will have the opportunity to try picking one quite soon, we are shopping for the components and vendors right now.

Since I’ve already given away everything but the details for whose patent application we are waiting before posting the design, I might as well give you the rest of the CV which won’t violate confidentiality. We’re using an eight pin array across the keyway, which will have castellated blocks as warding between the pins. The key looks like a miniature Braille data card in metal. It’s dimensions are that of a “thumb” drive for USB port, only the insertion part of the “blade” is 1 1/16 inches (27mm) OAL.
The pin “stroke” is 0.028 inches (0.7mm) as is the lift of each bit land on the key. There are 36 bit lands on the key, 30 of which produce rotation and the balance produce axial traverse. There are 40 permutation surfaces on the cam. (It turns out statistically that in order to have any pins’ displacement move the cam we needed to add the four “dummy” permutations.) The cam is journaled on ABEC 7 bearings. It requires 20 grams of force to displace a pin and only 4 to resist the cam bias springs. The dimension of the path through to each pin is approximately rectangular and 0.062 x 0.031 inches. So if you are going to try to manual manipulation, you might start with eight probes having the above section and reduce the section to 0.031 x 0.031. That will give you a facsimile of a bit land. I don’t think a human can pick it but we’ve given a lot of thought to how a device might be designed with sensors to infer the cam position instrumentally, and manipulate the eight probes via computer control of miniature servos. We tried to envision every frequency and type of energy that could be focused or detected through the cylinder and pins and encumber the potential data.
So I guess we won’t have to worry about finding lock experts to challenge the “unpickable” claim. We’d hoped to get some of the people at TOOOL who’d weighed in with advice right after DEFCON 15, to evaluate the pre-production samples. The pre-prod run will be a set of mastered deadbolts, using the sequences 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8… and 8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1… representing the first and last sequences of a set so large each human on the planet could have five billions of locks all with different keys. Our plan is to use some of these sets as demonstration units, for advertising, and some for promoting the “buzz” about the design by offering it to the people who advised that we proceed with it back in 2006. My intention was to contact those people when we have the pre-prod run in our hands. So much for good intentions.
This might have worked out better if Eric had waited to shake this particular tree until AFTER we revealed the final design animation and announced the MSRP. Eric meant well as do I. I think that you will better appreciate our good intentions when we reveal the MSRP. The technique of “assembling” the keys and cams rather than machining them is a huge cost-reduction factor. The use of capital tooling for foundry-produced components (an immense up-front expense) will eventually bring the price down to a very competitive level. The alloy specified for the cylinders cannot be processed except by EDM, so the initial production costs (in advance of parts made from the molds and dies) will be horrid, but brief.
According to a recent market survey 21% of Americans stated that $200 was the correct MSRP for a lock that would yield only at destruction or the authorized key, 9% stated that $250 was the correct MSRP. Surprisingly (for the U.S., where a lot of people don’t even lock doors), 47% of the respondents had added locks to their doors, 41% selected the lock themselves, only 7% employed the recommendation of a locksmith in making their selection. I think you get the picture.
Again, Moderator, I apologize if we’ve given offense. None was intended. When I asked Eric to consider how to use the internet to generate buzz, I was thinking in terms of video clips of the lock withstanding ordinance fire, carbide drills, graphics to make the size of the permutation set comprehensible to people who don’t use scientific notation. I’m still thinking in those terms because I’d like the “buzz” to be occurring primarily among the lock-buying general public, not simply among lock-picking experts. If you are one of the individuals named in the “TOOOL Testimonial” on our web-site, you would have and will be contacted when the initial sets are available so that you may claim one as an early supporter. If you are NOT one of those named please introduce yourself privately and allow me to send you also a set as penance for the trespass of my well-meaning associate.


Sincerely Yours,
Stephen Maples, Lead Design
Acer Sequence Locks LLC

[mh]

Hi Stephen,

Thanks for the clarification, I believe your approach of disclosing your identity is indeed the better approach.

About the latest concept you mentioned above - let me see if I got it:

Your new key looks similar to a VingCard, but much smaller, and with a 8 x 8 = 64 bit pattern;
it's read sequentially, like a CODIC key,but mechanically -
the secret is hidden in a "cam" piece inside the lock, that can move along its axis as well as rotate;
the correct key will rotate the "cam" 8 times and then the key can be turned to open the door;
an incorrect key will also do something with the "cam", but not rotate it to the correct end position, so the the key can not be turned;
the secret is hidden mainly by strong springs at the key interface that don't allow feedback from the "cam" to reach the key interface;
moving the "cam" is like moving through a labyrinth with only one way leading to the exit and all the other ways leading to a block -
would that be a good description?

That sounds like a very interesting concept.

Could there be problems from dirt or wear, because the system seems to be small and delicate?

And a lot of the security against manipulation will come from the way the "cam" acts when it reached a wrong state - will it "rewind", will it prevent further manipulation to still finally reach the correct state?

What options does the path on the key pattern offer for a valid key? +/-1 to the left or right, or all 8 positions? Or even 256 options?

Yes, I would indeed be interested in evaluating a prototype.

Cheers,
mh

[sevedus]

Thank you for kinds words and generous spirit, mh. Your apprehension of the function is quite close. The cam rotates upon the displacement of each "correct" pin in the sequence. So there are 30 individual rotations of the cam occurring during the keys' insertion. Each rotation is slightly more than 3 degrees of rotation.

We very carefully "tuned-in" the overlap of pin-permutation interactions as well as the "sweet-spot" or dwell, which occurrs when the peak of the current bit land passes beneath the point on pin. Both have carefully calculated radii so that while the current correct pin is whithin its' permutation the displacement of that pin pauses while the bit land of the previous correct pin allows that pin to retract and the bit land of the next pin begins raising it toward the next permutation.

Resisting contamination figured largely in the design of the mechanical package, either in the context of weather or of sabotage. So yes, there are some concerns about contamination of the mechanism. For example, the spings that bias the pins are really magnetic cylinders which pull the head of pin (cam side) back into full face contact with magnet creating a "seal". Also this arraingment produces a force profile opposite that of a mechanical spring, i.e., It requies maximum force to begin the pins' displacement and the least to complete it, because the magnetic force of attraction falls off so quickly. The pins "pop" slightly when they break free of the magnets to reduce tactile feedback.

We did sweat blood configuring the package for the size limitations, which required that the lock cylinder assembly must fit the footprint of current locks in the door as well as requiring that whatever configuration suited that application would also be functional in a padlock embodiment. You'll be able to order padlocks and deadbolts as keyed-alike families.

I've gotta go to work now. Thanks mh


sevedus

[keeferO]

As Stephen stated, I would also like to apologize to any person that might have been offended by my posts. My goal was to generate the initial "buzz" for our new design, not to upset or offend anyone. Where as this wasn't the greatest way to build publicity for the company, many of you are now aware of us and will be watching our every step. We ABSOLUTELY look forward to all of you attempting to break our lock when it becomes available. Your comments and thoughts on our lock design are most appreciated, and I personally would like to thank all of you that might become involved in this process.


Honestly,

Eric R. DIckerson
Marketing
Acer Sequence Locks

[Legion303]

My goal was to generate the initial "buzz" for our new design, not to upset or offend anyone.

This is, incidentally, one of the many reasons why I consider marketers to be the scum of the earth: this reliance on tricks and scheming to get people talking about their products rather than relying on good word of mouth or honest, capitalistic advertising. Congratulations.

-steve

[unlisted]

As Stephen stated, I would also like to apologize to any person that might have been offended by my posts. My goal was to generate the initial "buzz" for our new design, not to upset or offend anyone. Where as this wasn't the greatest way to build publicity for the company, many of you are now aware of us and will be watching our every step. We ABSOLUTELY look forward to all of you attempting to break our lock when it becomes available. Your comments and thoughts on our lock design are most appreciated, and I personally would like to thank all of you that might become involved in this process.


Honestly,

Eric R. DIckerson
Marketing
Acer Sequence Locks

Well, as others have stated, your method to generate said "buzz" was quite underhanded. May I recommend you use a more "professional" way from now on... Also, if you had researched this site a bit more you would of realized there is quite a few persons on here with amazing talent who could help/troubleshoot with your design(s), etc. (which, has still happened even with the OP's posting method.)

May I suggest once you do have a working design (manufactured) you may want to consider "donating" a handful to some members on this forum for testing, reviewing, etc. Yes, it would mean your company may incur a very small initial "loss" but I believe the feedback you would receive would be far greater than any monetary loss. (and trust me, if there is a flaw and/or a design weakness, someone on here would find it)

(I am not typing this as a Moderator, this is just my personal opinion)

[freakparade3]

(and trust me, if there is a flaw and/or a design weakness, someone on here would find it)

This is very true. The members here will come up with ways to test your locks that your tech people or locksmiths would never dream of.

[sevedus]

freakparade3 and moderator are right, of course, and timing is everything! It only took a couple of weeks in 2006 to get from an awareness of the "bumping" vulnerability to a sure cure for it, but getting from that point to the one where I borrow millions of dollars to tool up and manufacture required a couple of years more diligent effort.
Ryan Brazil and I went to school at the Dutch Open 2007 and took the lessons to heart. The really wild part of that experience was that when we disclosed the design, everybody had a caveat of some sort about some vulnerability or other. They demonstrated the best techniques they knew for us, knowing that we were going to take that knowledge home with us and design specifically to defeat those specific attempts. You can't get better design parameters than that at any price.

[mh]

Ryan Brazil and I went to school at the Dutch Open 2007 and took the lessons to heart. The really wild part of that experience was that when we disclosed the design, everybody had a caveat of some sort about some vulnerability or other.

Indeed, and most of this type of service even comes for free, as there are a lot of enthusiastic lock experts out there who do this just for the fun of it.

I would like to add that I do admire the invention of new lock technology if it's a really ingenious and / or high security concept (like e.g. the new Master Lock Axis). Inventing new technology is so much more difficult than dissecting something that's given to me and finding the flaws with it...
That's why I hope the locksport community will some day also design a true high security lock, see the http://www.tosl.org/ section.

Cheers,
mh

[mh]

getting from that point to the one where I borrow millions of dollars to tool up and manufacture

... I hope you manage to get the patent out before that point, so that you can get even some more peer review before starting that type of investment.

Cheers,
mh

[Legion303]

The members here will come up with ways to test your locks that your tech people or locksmiths would never dream of.

"Well, it survived the liquid oxygen. Let's expose it to hard vacuum and launch it into the sun, and see what happens."

Sorry, too much xkcd...

-steve

[sevedus]

Rather than wait until our lawyer vets the animation, we changed the front page image on the site to show what the new key looks like. It's a bit fore-shortened in that view but you get the idea of how the keys' bit lands are arrayed. Keep in mind that the key shown has an artificially regular sequence. The sequence shown is 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,1,2,3,4. A production sequence would show a messy, random distribution of bits on the key body instead.

Legion303 and freakparade3 are perhaps throwing down a gauntlet that we will leave in situ for the moment. We never expected to build a lock that is impenetrable. We don't think it exists. So the reference to LOX and pyrotechnics is a bit.... well, I guess we deserve it for the way we came in here. The point is that our specific design objectives were to:
1) raise the technical difficulty of the manual pick above human skill sets;
2) render impressioning a null set;
3) construct the lock so that specific impulses in any axis have no effect until reaching the yield strength of the metal;
4) render magnetic fields of any magnitude irrelevant;
5) insure that no "equalizer" effects , such as rubber tools, compressed air or fluids can produce effective motion of the cam;
6) maintain functionality across a wide temperature range;
7) prevent ANY drill bit from penetrating to the cam.

Okay, #7 is a bit over the top too, but the alloys and casting inclusions, as well as the array of pins are in front of the cam. The thing's got hardened steel balls and pins everywhere and a carefully disbursed layer of diamond grit is IMBEDDED. Basically we wanted destructive entry to be a big noisy production requiring a plasma torch or EDM. We even made sure that if someone pumps the lock mechanism full of water and then hits it with the discharge from a CO2 extinguisher to freeze the water and burst the cylinder with the expanding ice, they will get cold and wet but will not get in.

We have a pool going on how many point blank shots it'll take from the .50 cal Desert Eagle to drive the lock out of the 2 inch thick slab steel test plate. I calculated six, but who cares... won't we have fun doing all those tests to destruction.

[mh]

very nice!

Will the cam rewind once a wrong pin was activated? Can you hear the cam rewinding (with a contact microphone / amplifier?)
If it doesn't rewind, will an infinitely long key at one point open the lock?

Cheers,
mh

[sevedus]

Replying to mh

"Can you hear the cam rewinding (with a contact microphone / amplifier?)" Absolutely! The cam will always move out of sequence position once a wrong pin is activated, once the cam is out of position subsequent pin displacements have a statistical disadvantage . (I'm a huge fan of chaos theory. Murphy Rules!) But the cam will return to home position if and only if NO pins are displaced. The idea being that you shouldn't know whether you succeeded or failed until you stop trying or succeed. There IS an audible and tactile reaction to the fully completed sequence, but only during the actuation of the last two pins in the sequence.
"If it doesn't rewind, will an infinitely long key at one point open the lock?" Yes! You are describing a "brute force" decryption scheme which will always, eventually succeed. Because the odds of "guessing" the "next" pin will be one out of eight for the first pin, one out of seven for the second (only seven here because one pin is engaged), and because the "previous last engaged" pin will not have cleared its' permutation sufficiently to be used again, the balance of the pin selections are at one-in-six odds. I calculate the probability of success by this technique to be one in 1.604e28. This number of operations far exceeds the designed life expectancy of the device.
It is a design goal that any succeful NDE will involve instrumentation rather than manual skills. Simultaneous with the product design we've considered the design of the "magic" device, the "super-great-grand-master-key", that can "read" the permutations behind the pins. All I can say is that while I believe it may be possible to construct such a device it is beyond my competence and LOL to others.

sevedus

[mh]

I guess then manipulating would mean to bring the cam from a "dysfunctional" state back to the correct path without letting it rewind.
I'm quite curious to learn how you solved the challenge to prevent this.
Cheers
mh