Detecting picking

[mcm757207]

I believe detecting picking can be one of those important layers. This is especially true of the design I mentioned in my previous post in this thread... this design detects the act of manipulating the tumblers, not the rotation of the plug. This way the alarm could be triggered before the lock is even open, allowing more time for law enforcement response.

[FarmerFreak]

mcm757207, I really like the idea of the pressure sensors. Here is a few random thoughts that came to mind while thinking about them.

Use a solenoid or something of the sort to disconnect/reconnect a tailpiece/cam (something will have to be used to prevent solenoid bumping or vibration attacks, not sure on that yet, again just random thoughts). Masterkey the lock so it can be turned on many many many different combinations. Rely on the pressure sesnors to detect if it is being turned using the correct combination (on top of the picking detection it can currently give you). One last thing, because it would be really cool, thought the technology either isn't there yet or would be really expensive. Make it so the action of lifting the pins generates power and charges the lock!!

[FarmerFreak]

thought the technology

Should be "though the technology"

I should have proof read it...

[vov35]

Suppose we were to add a dust cover that must be moved aside to access the keyway, and have said dust cover connected to a normally open switch, which would then activate whatever monitoring circuitry there is. I mean a cover like those used in automotive locks...

[peterwn]

A lock that detects picking was invented almost 200 years ago. A Chubb detector lock has a mechanism that when tripped by picking mechanically locks out until reset by either the correct key or a special control key. This design could easily be modified to trip some sort of alarm.

A quick google search doesn't seem to have much info about them so if you have trouble seeing how the mechanism works I'll get some pictures of mine.

If any lever is lifted too high it toggles the detector lever which locks the bolt. To reset the toggle you turn the key to throw the bolt a bit further and there are extra slots in the lever gates to allow this. It follows that the reset key can be the ordinary key a masterkey or even a specific reset key depending on the owner's needs.

Bell Telephone Company I understand added a detector to its cash container locks on older style pay phones. It was reset by removing the separately locked mechanism cover and pushing a piece of wire into a hole in the cash container lock case (presumably a small hole was also provided between the two compartments for this purpose). Presumably a wrong key would not push the levers high enough to operate the detector otherwise there would be frequent technician callouts to free the detectors since I understand that the technician locks were keyed alike while the cash locks were keyed differently.

[vov35]

hmmm... but why would you be overlifting anything in the first place?

[vov35]

plus resetting it seems to be a fairly simple task in both mentioned examples.

[Evan]

I believe detecting picking can be one of those important layers. This is especially true of the design I mentioned in my previous post in this thread... this design detects the act of manipulating the tumblers, not the rotation of the plug. This way the alarm could be triggered before the lock is even open, allowing more time for law enforcement response.

So the act of inserting and removing an incorrect key (or two or three) would definitely trip the theoretical alarm device you are considering here... That would limit the utility of this device and would definitely incur the owner of the building alarm response fines unless it is only used by the internal security department to alert them to potential tampering...

I can say without reservations that the only employees in a large facility or institution who would know exactly which key to use for a given lock on the first try on a random door within a building on a large campus would be someone from the lock shop, or a senior trades worker or senior security officer...

I have personally observed a janitor covering in another building other than their normal assigned area try a dozen keys in a door before the correct one was located... That sort of activity which is totally authorized in nature sounds like it would definitely have triggered an alarm on this sort of cylinder which is being proposed here...

~~ Evan

[globallockytoo]

Suppose we were to add a dust cover that must be moved aside to access the keyway, and have said dust cover connected to a normally open switch, which would then activate whatever monitoring circuitry there is. I mean a cover like those used in automotive locks...

What about a rfid chip in the key that is detected by the cylinder and the dust cover/flap disengages only when the rfid chip/tag is in close proximity.

Then no access can be granted to any key or object that does not have a programmed chip.

No entry to the keyway means the lock cylinder cannot be NDE.

[vov35]

So the act of inserting and removing an incorrect key (or two or three) would definitely trip the theoretical alarm device you are considering here... That would limit the utility of this device and would definitely incur the owner of the building alarm response fines unless it is only used by the internal security department to alert them to potential tampering...

While I appreciate your effort at constructed criticism, I don't think you've actually thoroughly read and comprehended how his proposed means of detection would work.

What about a rfid chip in the key that is detected by the cylinder and the dust cover/flap disengages only when the rfid chip/tag is in close proximity.

I mean, they put rfid chips in car keys, and those can be copied...
And given the fact that they're wireless one could probably do it from a notable distance too.

I'd think that using the dust cover as a mechanical switch would be simpler and more difficult to circumvent without drilling.

[globallockytoo]

So the act of inserting and removing an incorrect key (or two or three) would definitely trip the theoretical alarm device you are considering here... That would limit the utility of this device and would definitely incur the owner of the building alarm response fines unless it is only used by the internal security department to alert them to potential tampering...

While I appreciate your effort at constructed criticism, I don't think you've actually thoroughly read and comprehended how his proposed means of detection would work.

What about a rfid chip in the key that is detected by the cylinder and the dust cover/flap disengages only when the rfid chip/tag is in close proximity.

I mean, they put rfid chips in car keys, and those can be copied...
And given the fact that they're wireless one could probably do it from a notable distance too.

I'd think that using the dust cover as a mechanical switch would be simpler and more difficult to circumvent without drilling.

but the dust cover is not "locked" to prevent unauthorised key entry.

with a controlled dust cap or flap, you effectively prevent any key ot=r tool from entering as keyway.

[Evan]

So the act of inserting and removing an incorrect key (or two or three) would definitely trip the theoretical alarm device you are considering here... That would limit the utility of this device and would definitely incur the owner of the building alarm response fines unless it is only used by the internal security department to alert them to potential tampering...

While I appreciate your effort at constructed criticism, I don't think you've actually thoroughly read and comprehended how his proposed means of detection would work.

What about a rfid chip in the key that is detected by the cylinder and the dust cover/flap disengages only when the rfid chip/tag is in close proximity.

I mean, they put rfid chips in car keys, and those can be copied...
And given the fact that they're wireless one could probably do it from a notable distance too.

I'd think that using the dust cover as a mechanical switch would be simpler and more difficult to circumvent without drilling.

but the dust cover is not "locked" to prevent unauthorised key entry.

with a controlled dust cap or flap, you effectively prevent any key ot=r tool from entering as keyway.

I wouldn't worry too much about this -- this "idea" seems a lot more fantasy than reality as it will require an external alarm system in order to function... Why someone would need a fancy new sensor for an alarm system is beyond me...

It also sounds as if given the latest "dust cover" idea that these locks will be restricted to ONLY rim and mortise cylinder types...

I really wish that the inventors of this idea would nail down an application and design the lock to that and not some impossible/implausible security detection application that is superfluous given that secure facilities will not need the capabilities it could offer as they already have the desired electronic protection installed and the potential market where actual interest in such a "security upgrade" able to be installed on a lock by lock basis in low security environs would imply installing the supporting alarm infrastructure where it does not exist... All of this without replacing the door hardware, only the cylinder itself -- which is why my concern all along has been how do you fit all of these 'discreet devices" inside the cylinder with whatever kind of controller/logic it needs inside the lock where the only external connection is the alarm contact...

That is why I have serious continued skepticism about the utility of this design...

~~ Evan

[Raymond]

That was one hell of a run-on sentence.

[vov35]

but the dust cover is not "locked" to prevent unauthorised key entry.

with a controlled dust cap or flap, you effectively prevent any key or tool from entering as keyway.

yes, but this also uses power when the system is inactive.

In fact, I'd combine unlocking the dust cover with another detection system, if for no other reason that I don't trust rfid.

[Evan]

but the dust cover is not "locked" to prevent unauthorised key entry.

with a controlled dust cap or flap, you effectively prevent any key or tool from entering as keyway.

yes, but this also uses power when the system is inactive.

In fact, I'd combine unlocking the dust cover with another detection system, if for no other reason that I don't trust rfid.

Correct, an actual alarm system that actually protects something needs to be powered all of the time, that way if the circuit fails, it can trigger an alarm condition or "battery loss" supervision message...

Not having the alarm circuit with the detectors powered at all times means the circuit can be destructively interrupted and won't do what you are designing because it won't be active when someone tampers with it, if the circuit is destroyed it won't "activate" the way you intend it to in your design...

~~ Evan